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Animals, animacy and anthropocentrism 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores various ways in which contemporary British English depicts 
degrees of animacy among nonhuman animals, and demonstrates the anthropocentric 
qualities of much discourse about animals. The first section reviews discussions of 
animacy in relevant research literature, highlighting how these often take for granted a 
categorical distinction between humans and other animals, before demonstrating how 
both corpus-assisted approaches to discourse analysis and developments in the 
analysis of animacy point to a more complex picture. The second section discusses 
the implications of recent work in social theory for understanding organisms, and 
their degrees of animacy, from the perspective of networks rather than hierarchies. 
The third section of the paper presents analyses of an electronically stored corpus of 
language about animals. Three analyses of naming terms, descriptors and verbal 
patterns associated with various non-human animals illustrate a range of ways in 
which their animacy is denoted and connoted. They also demonstrate the influence of 
discourse type and human purpose on depictions of animals and assumptions about 
their animacy.   
 
Introduction 
“It is just like man's vanity and impertinence to call an animal dumb because it is 
dumb to his dull perceptions.” 
Mark Twain What is Man? 
 
Human language is a human construct, so it is a truism that when linguists analyse its 
grammar and vocabulary they inevitably do so anthropocentrically. Notwithstanding 
recent findings about the capacities for communication of other species, there is no 
evidence that nonhumans have engaged in the metalinguistic enterprise represented in 
this journal. Neither do they (as far as we know) speculate as to the possible origins of 
their respective species or the evolutionary processes by which they have come to be 
what they are. Such observations give rise to a belief in human exceptionalism. 
Simultaneously, one of our limitations as human beings – even given the 
extraordinary affordances of the technology developed by members of our species – is 
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that we can only perceive the world from a human perspective, by using the senses 
available to our species. Humans are, by default, the yardstick or benchmark against 
which other species are compared. Attempts to challenge this, both ethical and 
ontological, go back centuries. In 1789, Jeremy Bentham proposed that ‘the question’ 
about how animals should be treated was not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? 
but Can they suffer? And the question of whether other animals are not so much 
lacking in human capacities as possessing different ones was raised by Montaigne in 
the 16th century. Both these issues continue in contemporary debates, which often 
touch on, but rarely explore in depth, the linguistic means by which animal 
experiences are encoded in language. How, then, are the modes of perception and 
action of nonhumans represented in human language? What role does language play 
in the hierarchical relationships between humans and other animals in terms of their 
respective degrees of animacy? Although such broad and deep questions are well 
beyond the scope of this short paper, I begin by sketching some key themes in this 
area, before introducing the corpus used as data for this study and the approaches I 
have taken to analysis. The remaining sections detail several explorations of how 
animals are depicted, with particular reference to the ways they are represented as 
agents of processes, leading to some conclusions about the challenges presented to 
conventional linguistic analyses by a topic-specific corpus of texts about non-human 
animals.   
 
Animacy: hierarchies and taxonomies  
Arguing for animacy as an ontological category, Dahl (2008: 142) defines it as “the 
capacity for perceiving and acting upon the environment”, while the linguistic 
definition proposed by Folli and Harley (2008: 191) is “the inherent qualities and 
abilities of the entity to participate in the eventuality denoted by the predicate”. 
Linguistic research into degrees of animacy usually notes a categorical distinction 
between humans and other animals, finding evidence across languages for that 
distinction being encoded in their grammars (e.g. Croft, 1991).  
 
Animacy is, for O. Dahl and Fraurud (1996), “at the bottom a question of a distinction 
between ‘persons, that is, essentially human beings perceived as agents, and the rest 
of the universe’” (cited in O. Dahl, 2008: 145). This “hierarchical scale of animate 
		 3	
and inanimate beings” is, according to Yamamoto (1999: 9), “a product of 
anthropocentric human cognition”; (see also Enger & Nesset, 2011). Humans are 
invariably represented as situated at the top of the hierarchy or the centre of the circle 
of animacy and/or empathy (Langacker, 1991). These spatial metaphors – the centre 
of the circle, the top of the hierarchy – have analogues, at least in Western European 
traditions, in representations of humans and other organisms in biological taxonomies. 
The Greek philosophers viewed both the social and natural worlds as gradations from 
the lowest to the highest (Clutton-Brock, 1995: 427), and I return to the implications 
of this linguistic-biological parallel below. The medieval belief in a Scale of Nature, 
or Great Chain of Being, posits a hierarchical scale of both animacy and importance, 
with non-living matter at the base, through plants and the ‘lower’ animals, up to the 
quadrupeds and then ‘Man’, above whom are found only the angels and God. This 
hierarchical arrangement, from which ‘Man’ looks down on other species, persists, 
but alongside it is an alternative vantage point, with the human at the centre and other 
organisms ranged around, here graded according to their utility to human beings. 
Such criteria are found alongside the descriptions of animals’ anatomy and behaviour 
that have been taken into account in taxonomies since Aristotle. Early modern 
classifications considered animals as edible/inedible, wild/tame and useful/useless 
(Thomas, 1983: 53), and this kind of approach is still adopted for some purposes. For 
example, Santamaria, Fallon, Green, Schulz, and Wilcke (2012) have developed an 
ontology for classifying animals in relation to their “practical uses that are of interest 
to science, medicine and agriculture”, including animals’ “production role such as 
meat or milk for human food” (p.1). However, since first Linnaeus and then Darwin, 
most biological taxonomies have been based on explicitly objective criteria, 
consistent with another metaphorical image, “the phylogenetic tree, which, at least in 
general form and shape, resembles a genealogical tree of a human dynasty” (Tudge, 
2000: 3). Whereas the hierarchies presented in contemporary zoology textbooks 
therefore eschew classification by superficial characteristics such as visual or 
behavioural similarity, making use instead of information about shared evolutionary 
history, they nevertheless tend to be organised in sections which echo earlier 
hierarchies, from the smallest and least complex organisms at the base to the most 
complex and ‘sophisticated’ at the apex.  
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Classification of the diversity of life-forms has been a consistent concern of 
zoologists – and of course it has implications for nomenclature and thus for linguistic 
systems. As (Thomas, 1983: 52) notes, consistently with the cognitive linguists cited 
above: 
… all observation of the natural world involves the use of mental categories 
with which we, the observers, classify and order …; and it is notorious that, 
once these categories have been learned, it is very difficult for us to see the 
world in any other way. 
 
These mental – and linguistic – categories are also sustained by cultural and political 
arrangements. While ethologists may be providing ever more evidence of cognition, 
emotion, and sociality in creatures previously regarded as lacking significant 
capacities, the implications may be inconvenient for vested interests, such as the meat 
industry, for example. As Nussbaum (2007: 35) notes, “we need to remember that we 
are relatively ignorant of what a good life for each sort of animal is and strongly 
biased in favor of our own power and interests.” 
 
Linguistic markers of animacy 
Research into linguistic indicators of animacy has often had the aim of cross-
linguistic comparison and the identification of universals. So, understandably, with 
limited exceptions (see below), fine-grained comparisons between any potential 
linguistic markers for different categories of non-humans are rarely found in these 
accounts. Some of the linguistic dimensions identified by previous researchers, such 
as case marking (e.g. Comrie, 1989; Malchukov, 2008), are less relevant in the 
context of the present study; similarly, first and second person pronominals rarely 
feature in relation to animals in our data. A recent project aimed at annotating corpora 
of contemporary English for animacy (Zaenen et al., 2004) concluded that as a 
linguistic category it is far from being well understood; furthermore, these authors 
found too few occurrences of their ‘ANIMAL’ category in the corpora they used to 
produce any results. They also point out discrepancies between linguistic and 
biological definitions of both the animate/non-animate distinction and the human/non-
human one (see also Atran 1999, De Swart et al. 2008; c.f. Arluke and Sanders, 1996, 
on the ‘sociozoologic scale’).  
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Three linguistic markers in particular have received attention, however, in literature 
that is concerned specifically with how animals are represented in (English) 
discourse. One of these is the number system, and the tendency for words for 
commodified animals to be unmarked in the plural (sheep, fish), and/or to function as 
mass nouns (lamb, chicken, livestock) (e.g. Halliday, [1990] 2001; Stibbe, 2006). 
Another is the choice of pronouns: who vs. which; he, she vs. it etc. (e.g. Gupta, 2006; 
Sealey & Oakley, 2013). And a third is the inclusion in the gender system of some 
animals and the exclusion of others (e.g. Gilquin & Jacobs, 2006). While the present 
study concerns only English, it is interesting that descriptions of various languages 
note differential applications of the gender system for animals of different kinds (e.g. 
distinctive genders being accorded to those thought of as ‘important or interesting’, 
Leheckovd 2000, or as having some ‘social standing’, Mosel & Spriggs 2000). 
Indeed, Dahl (2000: 100) recognises that, at least in respect of gender, “[i]t is 
misleading, in most cases, to think of ANIMAL as a single ‘step’ in the hierarchy”. 
Elsewhere, Dahl (2008: 142) explains that in his view animacy is not reducible to a 
single hierarchy but rather “tends to interact with a host of other factors, yielding 
bundles of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties that tend to occur together”. 
Similarly, Hopper and Thompson (1994: 357) maintain that grammatical markers of 
properties such as animacy derive from “the entire range of cognitive, social, and 
communicative factors involved in the actual use of language”.  
 
Humans and other animals as networks 
As the effects of human activity on the planet become increasingly obvious and 
alarming, the long-established patterns of biological hierarchies are being unsettled by 
the work of social theorists such as Deleuze, Guattari, Latour, Haraway, Barad, 
Braidotti, DeLanda and others. Space does not permit more than a very cursory 
exposition of these ideas, but some of the challenges of post-humanism and the ‘new 
materialisms’ (Coole & Frost, 2010b) that are most relevant to this paper include the 
following: a breaking down of any absolute distinction between human and other life-
forms; a recognition that “the material realm is irreducible to culture or discourse and 
that cultural artifacts are not arbitrary vis-à-vis nature” (Coole & Frost, 2010a: 27); a 
rejection of reductive individualism in favour of relationality, and of linear causality 
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in favour of complex, dynamic, and processual explanations. Also significant, for the 
current paper, is the reaction against a concern with ‘macrobes’ at the expense of 
microbes (Dupré, 2012: 75). As we found in our research, when people are prompted 
to reflect on ‘animals’, the kinds that typically come to mind are those that are ‘big 
like us’ (Hird, 2009) – vertebrates, sexual reproducers, creatures conventionally 
thought of as separate, integral beings, susceptible to the kinds of classification 
summarised above. However, as biologists and philosophers continue to grapple with 
‘the species problem’ (Pavlinov, 2013), they encounter “… the question whether life 
can indeed be arranged in a tree, or whether we must rather see it as a web or net” 
(Dupré, 2012: 12), and life-forms as temporary ‘assemblages’ (Bennett, 2010; 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1988; Hird, 2009). 
 
A corpus of texts about animals 
The research project into the discursive representation of animals, on which this paper 
draws, collected data from a wide range of sources, including many different kinds of 
texts featuring many different kinds of animal, in order to identify patterns in how 
contemporary British English speakers refer to nonhuman animals (see Appendix for 
a list of corpus contents).1 By confining our list of animal naming search terms to 
those for animals visible to the naked (human) eye, we too were guilty of 
‘macrobocentrism’ (Dupré & O'Malley, 2007: 842), which privileges the conception 
of every ‘animal’ as an independent, multicellular individual. As explained elsewhere 
(Sealey & Pak, forthcoming in 2018), composing a list of search terms in order to 
identify relevant texts for the corpus was not a straightforward matter. Nevertheless, 
this process confirmed that it is mainly as individual entities that our language 
represents animals and animal kinds to us. (There are additional naming terms for the 
products derived from animals for consumption, and for categorising animals 
according to how they feature in human experience, which we discuss elsewhere, but 
this does not undermine the general point about how English vocabulary itemises 
living organisms.) Contemporary challenges to these assumptions (of 
‘macrobocentrism’, and of animals as independent, multicellular individuals visible to 
humans) derive from the acknowledgement of the interaction, within any living 
organism, of multiple life-forms, leading to “the collapse of the autonomous 
individual organism in favour of organisms as assemblages” (Hird, 2009: 67), where 
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microbes not only ‘invade’ bodies to cause infection, but co-exist and co-operate 
with, and indeed are essential for the existence of, the larger bodies where they live. 
This insight has implications for the identification of degrees of animacy, and the 
language in which to denote these, as we shall see.   
 
I turn now to the specifics of the naming terms in our corpus of texts about animals. 
Our corpus contains a range of discourse types, constructed around a search list of 
over 2000 animal naming terms. As mentioned above, this list did not include terms 
for micro-organisms, although such words do feature in some of the texts we 
collected, particularly the academic science journal articles. The questions addressed 
in the remainder of the paper are the following, in relation to the animals named in the 
corpus: How are degrees of animacy indicated in the patterns of verbs of which 
animal naming terms are subjects? How consistent are representations of animacy 
across different discourse types? To what extent do these patterns accord with the 
hierarchies recorded in the literature cited above? 
 
Approaches to analysis 
The investigation of degrees of animacy associated with different animals in the texts 
that comprise our corpus necessitates taking account of a range of linguistic features, 
discoursal, semantic and grammatical. In the present study, the focus is predominantly 
on verbs of which animals are subjects or agents, and the approach I have taken is 
empirical, inductive and iterative. One candidate approach, from Systemic Functional 
Linguistics, is the transitivity system, which “construes the world of experience into a 
manageable set of PROCESS TYPES” (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 170). A 
potential problem here, as reported in an earlier study (Sealey & Oakley, 2013) is that 
of circularity, in that an attribute identified as indicating ‘animacy’ may be 
presupposed in the definition. Thus in Halliday’s transitivity system, a verb is 
classified as of the ‘mental process’ type if it meets the following condition: “there is 
always one participant [the ‘Senser’] who is human … [or] human-like; the 
significant feature … is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’” (2004: 201). 
This raises a question for the classification of verbs of which animals are subjects: 
does the use of a verb denoting a mental process confer consciousness and thus 
animacy on to the subject, or does the fact that the subject is not in other respects 
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‘human or human-like’ preclude it from being a Senser? The highlighted verbs in 
sentences such as these (all from our corpus) illustrate the issue: 
(1) In a preference test prior to training, the horse chose the smaller of the two 
circles 
(2) Lizards, snakes, and turtles select environmental temperatures where the 
detection and capture of prey, reproduction, and digestive processes are most 
efficient 
(3) Planktivorous fish preferred large-bodied over small-bodied zooplankton as 
food source 
(4) The tide had turned and the seal decided to return to the water, quite happily 
and without any pressure from us 
(5) What these larvae want is a lift, a ride, and they want it so badly that 
sometimes they'll even try and get it from a human finger. 
 
These sentences illustrate the gradient nature of any putative hierarchy of animacy 
among non-human species. Readers may find less to object to in the description of a 
horse ‘choosing’ one of two objects than of larvae ‘badly wanting’ a ride.2 The first 
three, taken from academic journal articles, are examples of polysemous, or at least 
ambiguous, verbs. When scientists report the behaviour of non-human creatures, they 
are obliged by the conventions governing their publications to avoid “ascribing to 
nonhuman entities the intention to do something” (Goldbort, 2006: 25; see also 
Rabinowitz & Vogel, 2009: 23, Sealey and Pak, under review). In fact, the author of 
this manual for science writers disapproves of ‘prefer’ to denote animals’ ingestion of 
one substance rather than another, on the grounds that the researcher can only attest to 
what the animals consumed, and cannot know for sure whether they ‘preferred’ it. But 
to what extent is an internal process of intention entailed in externally observable 
behaviour? Should ‘select’, ‘prefer’ and ‘want’ in these examples be interpreted 
metaphorically, and/or as evidence of anthropomorphism? Does ‘want’ here connote a 
state of desire (as could be implied by ‘badly’) or of need? (Compare “these shoes 
[inanimate] want [= stand in need of] a good polish”.) Readers will probably also not 
be surprised to learn that the examples are taken from different discourse genres: (1), 
(2) and (3) are from academic journal articles, (4) from a campaigning text and (5) 
from the commentary to a television broadcast. In short, it is clear that classification 
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of verbs within the SFL typology is far from adequate as an indication of degree of 
animacy in this particular context. Furthermore, it is my contention, as illustrated by 
these examples and in accordance with the claims by Dahl (2008) and Hopper and 
Thompson (1994) cited above, that variations in discourse types and communicative 
purpose lead to variations in how the same kind of animal is represented in language. 
To explore this further, I present several approaches to analysis.  
 
Analysis 1 provides an overview of the verbs associated with numerous animals in 
just one genre of writing, namely our sub-corpus (approximately 6 million words) of 
articles published in journals concerned with biology, veterinary and environmental 
science etc. Here, the verbs associated with the full range of animal naming terms 
(identified by a tagging process explained in Sealey and Pak, forthcoming) were 
identified and classified semantically, illustrating the degrees of animacy afforded to 
animals as they appear in this kind of scientific writing. In light of limitations of 
space, this analysis focuses primarily on the passive constructions that are 
(predictably) particularly frequent in this genre. Analysis 2 is a more fine-grained 
investigation that compares and contrasts the verbs associated with a small number of 
different animals chosen as ‘case studies’, while Analysis 3 contrasts how just one of 
these ‘case study’ animals is depicted in different discourse genres, by comparing 
findings across different sub-corpora. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note some of the challenges associated with 
these kinds of analysis. As explained elsewhere (Sealey and Pak, forthcoming), our 
corpus is relatively small in relation to the wide range (over 2000) of animal naming 
terms used to compile it. This means that many of the figures returned are also quite 
small, and so cannot be considered statistically significant. Therefore it is often 
appropriate to look closely at the results generated by corpus tools; this is quite 
practical with only small numbers of concordance lines to examine. Furthermore, the 
automated tagging and parsing tools available are considerably less than 100% 
accurate. While this is a common challenge for corpus analysis, the errors in this 
particular data set are revealing in themselves, highlighting some of the peculiarities 
in the ways animals are represented in different kinds of discourse. 
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Analysis 1: Subject animals in scientific journal articles 
This part of the study used AntConc (Anthony, 2014) and a search based on the string 
{animal-naming-term + verb} in the Journals sub-corpus (which is tagged both for 
animal naming terms and Part of Speech (POS)). Although this string does not 
retrieve all the relevant data, because of intervening adverbs, pronominal substitutions 
etc., the search nevertheless generates some interesting findings. The most frequent 
verb immediately following an animal naming term in the Journals sub-corpus is were 
(8416 occurrences), of which the great majority (6047) are in passive constructions, 
where the entities referred to all feature as the ‘patients’ of processes done to them. A 
wide range of verbs (551 different verb types) occurs in these passive constructions, 
where an animal naming term immediately precedes the string {were + past 
participle}, but of these 203 occur only once and another 83 only twice. Table 1 
shows the most frequent 34 verb types, which all occur 30 times or more, grouped 
semantically. The verbs given (ranked 13th) and allowed (22nd), which have multiple 
meanings, are not included in this table; instead some illustrative concordance lines 
are provided below. 
 
Type of process Verb Frequency Rank by frequency 
sustain fed 323 1 
 offered 49 28= 
 maintained 102 10 
situate housed 220 2 
 kept 187 4 
 collected 179 5 
 placed 129 8 
 found 134 7 
 removed 71 20 
 transferred 45 31= 
 obtained 82 16 
 divided 67 21 
 selected 54 25 
survey used 203 3 
 observed 150 6 
 weighed 125 9 
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 tested 78 16 
 sampled 62 23 
 examined 58 24 
 identified 51 26= 
 recorded 49 28= 
 monitored 40 34 
intervene exposed 100 11 
 treated 97 12 
 anesthetized (variant spellings) 87 15 
 injected 73 18 
 subjected 51 26= 
 infected 47 30 
 challenged 45 31= 
kill sacrificed 91 14 
 killed 75 18 
Table 1. The most frequent verbs in the passive clause construction 
{animal-naming-term + were + past participle}  
 
The entities and experiences that animals ‘were given’ and ‘were allowed’ include: 
a) sustenance 
(6) animals were given a 100g mixed preload of ground barley 
(7) mice were allowed access to food and water ad libitum 
(8) foxes were given approximately half of their daily food provision 
(9) ticks were allowed to feed on healthy calves   
 
b) biochemical interventions 
(10) rats were given pioglitazone (10 mg/kg, p.o., daily) for 4 weeks 
(11) clouded leopards were given ketamine hydrochloride (11.0mg/kg) 
intramuscularly 
(12) piglets were given 2ml of ferrodextran 
(13) rats were given thyrotropin releasing hormone 
 
c) time 
(14) Horses were allowed 21-day adaptation periods 
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(15) pigs were given time to explore the new location 
(16) ewes were given seven days to get used to the experimental conditions 
 
d) behavioural experiences 
(17) Mice were given two training sessions 
(18) dogs were given the task of determining the correct direction 
(19) hatchlings were allowed to crawl on the sand in the hatchery under open 
conditions 
(20) calves were allowed to stay with the cow   
(21) sheep were given the choice between different flooring materials 
(22) sows were allowed to mix with other sows   
 
To complement these findings, some of the other most frequent verbs of which animal 
naming terms are the subject were identified. This analysis revealed that, even in 
clauses that are in the active voice, many of the frequent verbs denote processes in 
which the animals’ role is relatively passive. For example, it is reported that animals 
‘accepted’, ‘ate’, ‘consumed’ and ‘received’ what was given to them. As research 
subjects, they ‘experienced’ and ‘underwent’ (e.g. ‘examination’, ‘tests’) and 
‘demonstrated’, ‘displayed’, ‘presented’, ‘revealed’ and ‘showed’ things of interest to 
the scientists. Animals ‘excreted’ and ‘shed’ (e.g. ‘virus’, ‘eggs’). As (parts of) their 
bodies changed, they ‘became’, ‘decreased’, ‘developed’, ‘formed’, ‘gained’, ‘grew’, 
‘increased’, ‘reached’ (e.g. a ‘stage’ or ‘target’, ‘puberty’), ‘weighed’ and ‘averaged’. 
Other verbs in the active voice include ‘remained’, ‘survived’ and ‘died’. 
 
The data analysed here includes accounts of the experiences of a heterogeneous 
collection of animals. Overall, the analysis illustrates how these animals’ experiences 
are all heavily managed by the people researching them. As I have noted elsewhere 
(Sealey and Pak, under review), any potential differences in the characteristics of 
types of animal are often seen as a hindrance to research, and critics suggest that 
laboratory animals, selectively bred and standardised as generic ‘models’ of their kind 
(Birke, 2012), “have moved from being biological creatures to objects or tools for 
human use” (DeMello, 2012: 182). With some exceptions, then, it is animals’ 
passivity, rather than their animacy, that is highlighted by the language in these 
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science journal articles. The fact that this finding is unsurprising may be seen in the 
light of contemporary questioning of laboratory practices, and specifically the ways in 
which these are designed so as to preclude the possibility of animals demonstrating 
their own concerns or interests, as opposed to those of the humans researching them 
(Despret, 2016: 91). 
 
Analysis 2: Animals compared across the whole corpus 
With over 2000 animal naming terms in our heterogeneous corpus, only a small 
subset occur often enough, across a wide enough range of genres, to reveal linguistic 
patterns. From these, a selection was made of a manageable number to compare and 
contrast in respect of the patterns in which they are found. The main criterion for 
selection was frequency in the corpus, both overall and in the sub-corpora of different 
discourse types (see Sealey and Pak, forthcoming). A second criterion was variety of 
biological and cultural types, so that the case study animals would represent a range 
for comparison. In light of these criteria, the animal naming terms selected were 
dog(s), cow(s), fish, bird(s) and bee(s). It is immediately apparent that these items are 
not equivalent kinds of designation, although they are all relatively familiar to most 
people. Predictably, there are more occurrences in the corpus of superordinates, such 
as ‘bird(s)’ (4446) than, for example, ‘pigeon(s) (267) or ‘magpie(s)’ (35). 
Taxonomically, ‘dogs’ and ‘cows’ are both terrestrial mammals, the former belonging 
to the family of ‘caniform’ carnivores and the latter ruminant herbivores, but although 
both subdivide into different ‘breeds’ there is more variation in the kinds of animal 
classified as dogs than as cows. ‘Bees’ are classified as insect pollinators of the order 
Hymenoptera, suborder Apocrita (Tudge, 2000: 305), whereas there is little 
agreement on the definition of ‘fish’ (Dupré, 1999), beyond the colloquial designation 
of “any vertebrate that is basically streamlined and is basically a swimmer, propels 
itself primarily by undulations of the body, and breathes by gills” (Dupré 1999: 348). 
The focus of this investigation, however, is what kinds of behaviour each animal is 
associated with in this corpus of contemporary British English, and corpus analytic 
tools were used to make some initial comparisons. 
 
For this I used the ‘word sketch’ and ‘sketch-diff’ functions in Sketch Engine 
(Kilgarriff & Lexical Computing). ‘Word sketches’ are summaries of a word’s 
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grammatical and collocational behaviour, showing the word’s collocates categorised 
by grammatical relations, including, as is the focus here, verbs of which the animal 
naming term serves as subject.3 The ‘sketch-diff’ function compares two word 
sketches, in this case those for each of the ‘case study’ animal naming terms as 
compared with each of the others, with specific attention to the verbs of which each is 
identified as subject.  
 
As previously noted, some of the numbers involved are quite small, so that even log 
dice scores of 7 or above may derive from limited numbers of occurrences; for this 
reason, examples of the words in context are provided with the discussion. In 
addition, many highly frequent verbs, including non-lexical be, have and do are 
uninformative without further investigation. As mentioned above, there is quite a high 
proportion of errors in the automatic parsing, and although this causes some 
problems, some of the errors provide evidence of the anthropocentricity of the texts 
on which automatic parsers are trained. For example, the following were parsed as 
though the animal naming term was the subject of the verb: 
(23) proportion of cows observed self-grooming 
(24) the cows milked three times per day 
 
Another example of this mis-parsing is where SketchEngine identifies 12 occurrences 
of ‘farm’ as a verb of which ‘fish’ is the subject, as in a sentence beginning, 
‘Considering the fish farms separately …’. These 12 instances are a small proportion 
of the 161 occurrences of the string ‘fish farm(s)’, which is itself only one example of 
the pattern {animal-naming-term + farm(s)}. Others include: ‘pig farm’, ‘sheep farm’, 
‘shrimp farm’ and ‘shellfish farm’. There are also 51 occurrences of ‘fur farm’, where 
the animal product, rather than the animal itself, is the modifier, and ‘factory farm’, 
where the modifier has a different semantic function. This is also the case with 
‘family farm’ (31 occurrences), where we readily infer that the modifier denotes an 
organizational arrangement and not the product of the farming enterprise. Automatic 
parsers, however, lack the world knowledge that enables the human reader to process 
these distinctions without pausing to reflect on them. 
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Bearing in mind these caveats, the ‘subject of’ function in sketch-diff calculations 
should highlight those verbs of which the named animals are subjects. As in Analysis 
1 above, many of the processes shared between these five animal naming terms 
denote basic existence: e.g. live, become, experience, survive, consume, eat – and also 
die. The relations between animals and human perspectives are evident again in verbs 
denoting that they both provide information: e.g. show, exhibit, present and are used 
for human purposes: e.g. produce:  
(25) dairy cows produce both milk and calves (journals)  
(26) efficient cows produce more milk from the same energy intake (journals)  
(27) Each one [egg] rolls down on to another conveyor belt as soon as the bird 
produces it (news)  
 
Cognitive linguists have pointed out that the location of the human body in space 
provides the default stance for linguistic denotations of perspective and motion 
(Levinson, 2003; Talmy, 2000), which perhaps makes alternative means of 
locomotion worthy of comment. Some of the verbs identified by the process used here 
recall children’s early reading books, from which they learn that fish ‘swim’ and birds 
‘fly’, e.g:  
 
(28) I like watching birds flying overhead (Mass Observation)  
(29) You see all these big fish swimming about and it’s like an aquarium 
(broadcast)  
(30) Reef fish swim out to gorge themselves (broadcast)  
 
Likewise, the sounds made by different kinds of animals are highlighted by this 
process, but interestingly these are predominantly choices made by transcribers of the 
qualitative interviews we conducted for the project and of television broadcasts. Thus, 
dogs ‘bark’ and birds ‘chirp’ when the sounds these animals make are noted for 
viewers of subtitles and readers of the transcripts. 
 
(31) (dog barking) We know what you sound like thank you (interview with dog 
owner)  
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(32) A world lost in the vastness of the Pacific (birds chirping) home to the 
strangest life imaginable (broadcast)  
 
The impression produced by this analysis is consistent with the summary presented 
above, of nonhumans existing fairly passively in a human-centred environment, 
except insofar as they make their presence felt by the sounds they produce and their 
contrasting modes of locomotion. These animals are animate, but in a relatively 
undifferentiated way, depicted from a perspective that emphasizes their utility to 
humans as sources of produce and information. In the third analysis I delve a little 
deeper by contrasting different modes of discourse in respect of just one of these ‘case 
study’ animal types. 
 
Analysis 3: Contrasting representations of dogs  
The salience of dogs in contemporary British discourse about animals is evident from 
the fact that dog(s) was one of the most frequent animal naming terms across all 
discourse types in our corpus. So as to be able to identify robust linguistic patterns, 
we further supplemented our corpus data about this animal in two ways. We were 
fortunate to be given access to a set of interviews conducted by one of our consultants 
with people who live with dogs as companions, which supplements our other elicited 
data (i.e. written submissions from the Mass Observation Project directive on 
‘Animals and Humans’; interviews with professional communicators about animals; 
and focus groups with a range of different participants). We also collected, in addition 
to the news sub-corpus derived from our full list of animal name search terms, a 
further corpus of news texts (just over 4,500,000 words) featuring our five case study 
animals, including dogs.  
 
As before, the analysis began by identifying the verbs of which the animal naming 
term was the subject – in this case dog(s). The datasets used were (a) the legislation 
sub-corpus, (b) the supplementary news corpus and (c) the elicited data corpus. For 
this analysis, descriptors for dog(s) were also identified. Some of the patterns found 
are inevitably the product of the discourse features of the respective genres. For 
example, legal discourse is “extremely conservative” and seeks precision and a 
restriction on potential interpretations (Bhatia, Langton, & Lung, 2004: 206). News is 
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characterized by recognized ‘values’, including negativity (Bednarek, 2006; Bell, 
1991), while our elicited data involved respondents replying to questions and prompts 
that were phrased in particular ways, which may have influenced their own 
formulations.  
 
Dogs have a liminal legal status, “somewhere in between a person and a piece of 
personal property” (Garner, 2002: 85n, citing a legal judgement). The word sketch for 
dog(s) in our legislation sub-corpus shows them as subjects of very few active verbs, 
with one instance each, for example, of ‘defecate’ and ‘kill’ – both prohibited actions, 
in specified circumstances, for which the owner would be held responsible. Other 
offences for which owners would be liable are mitigated by exceptions when a human 
is ‘in charge of’ a dog ‘being used’ in various ways: 
• for [a blind] person's guidance 
• for the driving or tending of sheep or cattle 
• on official duties by a member of Her Majesty 's Armed Forces or Her 
Majesty's Customs 
• in emergency rescue work. 
 
The impression of dogs as (living) tools is supported by phrases such as “the manner 
in which the dog is used”, whereas the animals’ inherent agency is more evident in 
the following examples, which allude to their potential to act in accordance with 
different interests from those of the people deemed responsible for them: 
(33) a dog is out of control if (a) it is not being kept under control effectively and 
consistently 
(34) in particular the dog is brought under sufficiently close control to ensure 
that it does not prevent or obstruct achievement.  
 
A kind of personhood, in the sense of accountability, is connoted by the word choice 
in the following examples too, where a word or phrase denoting a human agent could 
readily be substituted for ‘the dog’ (though not in the final, passive clause of (36)): 
(35) the dog is subject to the prohibition in section 1 (3) above  
(36) the court shall order that unless the dog is exempted from that prohibition 
within the requisite period the dog shall be destroyed 
		 18	
 
When the law is broken, news is often made, as it is by unexpected events and when 
human beings or their property are hurt or damaged. Many of the news texts that 
feature dogs include them as the subjects of the verb attack. In this sub-corpus, where 
incidents are often reported in quoted first-person accounts, dogs may feature as 
active attackers, e.g.: 
(37) Initially one of the dogs attacked me, then as it was latched onto my arm the 
other two dogs started to attack my dog.  
 
As in that example, the ‘victims’ of the attack may be not only humans but also other 
animals: 
(38) This dog has violently attacked numerous cattle and horses since its escape.  
(39) I have experience of an aggressive little dog attacking a harmless big one.  
 
However, when the victims are human, it is they who are likely to be foregrounded, 
sometimes by presentation of the surrounding circumstances in an extended narrative, 
as in these examples: 
(40) it was at this point one of their dogs attacked the baby 
(41) friendly relations deteriorated and reached a nadir this summer when the 
dog attacked the Malias' son 
(42) shouted at her to “keep pedalling” – but the dogs attacked and dragged her 
off the bike 
(43) The girl was picking flowers near Hillcross Avenue at about 3pm on 
Saturday when the dog attacked 
 
The humans affected are also foregrounded through the use of passive constructions: 
(44) Nine postmen and women were attacked by dogs every day last year 
(45) A 12-year-old girl was attacked by a dog as she played with her sister in a 
south London park 
(46) Jade Anderson was attacked by four dogs while alone in a friend's house  
(47) He was attacked by two dogs, and it carried on for 20 minutes.  
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And the negativity of the news story is heightened by details of the victims’ injuries in 
these mostly passive constructions: 
(48) A FOUR-year-old girl has been left scarred for life after being attacked by a 
Japanese Akita dog 
(49) Seventy-nine-year-old Clifford Clarke died after being attacked by a dog in 
the garden of his home 
(50) Nearly 3,800 people in England needed emergency hospital treatment after 
being attacked by dogs last year 
(51) A two-year-old boy has suffered serious facial injuries after being attacked 
by two dogs in Wiltshire 
(52) Four-year-old Lexi Branson suffered horrific injuries after the dog attacked 
her at their home 
(53) In September a woman had her left arm almost mauled off after her pet 
Canary dog attacked her 
 
A ‘Canary dog’ is a cross between mastiff and bulldog, and this story continues with a 
quote describing it as “a fearless, powerful and able fighting machine”. This is 
consistent with the idea of the dog as a tool, with the potential to be ‘out of (human) 
control’.  The collocation ‘dangerous dog(s)’ occurs 95 times in this news corpus, and 
fear of this phenomenon has been identified as a ‘moral panic’ (Cameron, 1995). In 
this discourse, the dogs are perceived as ‘tools’ used by humans for criminal ends, but 
are themselves punished, by being ‘destroyed’, for having “the wrong imputed 
characteristics” (Hallsworth, 2011: 391). These are the villains of the dog news 
stories.  
 
However, another frequent modifier of dog(s) in this corpus is ‘guide’ (84 
occurrences), and here the picture is different. As illustrated in the following 
examples, these dogs are depicted as having a positive role in human experience, 
‘bringing joy’, ‘making a positive difference’ and being ‘essential’ for some particular 
human needs. 
(54) Guide dogs are essential for the mobility, independence and dignity of blind 
men and women 
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(55) HEARTLESS thieves stole a guide dog which brought joy to a woman who 
lost her sight ten years ago 
(56) her aunt became acutely aware of what an incredibly positive difference a 
guide dog can make to the lives of those with sight loss 
 
They are also depicted as exceptional, in comparison to other dogs, and of high 
monetary value: 
(57) Our policy is to allow guide dogs only into our restaurants 
(58) In Britain there are about 5,000 working guide dogs, which cost the Guide 
Dog Association £35,000 in food, vets' bills and sundries to maintain  
(59) The thorough and specialised training that transforms a new-born puppy 
into a confident guide dog takes about 20 months 
 
News stories also illustrate the idea of the dog as property from which people can 
profit, whether legitimately or not: 
(60) This, they say, allows thieves to identify dogs worth stealing 
(61) Young pedigree dogs can fetch between £400 and £500, but older dogs are 
worth a lot less 
(62) A good dog can earn a man hundreds of thousands. Star dogs are worth 
between £30,000 and £50,000 
 
However, the dog as person, as well as property, is represented in an account of a 
theft: 
(63) This is not about how much the two dogs are worth in monetary terms, but 
about having two much-loved members of their family snatched 
 
It is as ‘kin’ that the collector of two components of the third data-set used in this 
analysis explores the role of dogs in human society £Charles, 2014 #2581$, and these 
texts illustrate some different linguistic features from those found in laws and in news 
stories. The respondents to the Mass Observation directive and those interviewed 
about the dogs they lived with refer to dogs’ value to humans, as in these examples, 
which are just two of the several instances of dogs being described as ‘loyal’: 
		 21	
(64) dogs are very loyal easy to train and there seem to be many instances of 
them saving people’s lives 
(65) dogs are very loyal and they can be taught how to do tasks which help their 
master 
 
Other examples, from a range of respondents in the elicited data include: 
(66) a dog is utterly devoted to you and is completely loyal 
(67) A dog is very loyal, I do not know of any other animal that would come near 
to it 
 
While ‘loyal’ connotes the relationship between dog and human, it affords the former 
a greater degree of agency than is evident in the tool/machine image seen in the 
previous discourses. Other descriptors include ‘dependable’, ‘loving’, ‘giving’, 
‘lovely’, ‘friendly’, ‘cheeky’, ‘reliable’, ‘special’ and ‘intelligent’: 
(68) dogs are very loyal and giving 
(69) dogs are by nature very loyal and dependable they come when called and 
generally are very loving 
(70) you couldn't get any more loving than these dogs are 
(71) he's a very loving, friendly dog 
(72) they've all been loving and cheeky, so. . . He's special because he's ours 
(73) I believe that there is a lot of truth in a dog being a person's best friend. They 
are much more reliable and loving than most humans.  
(74) we had Dalmatians, and they’re lovely dogs … they 're very intelligent, but 
no I think spaniels are more loving 
 
This data-set also includes references to a wider range of abilities, as in the following 
examples, where dog(s) is the subject of the cognitive verbs know and understand, as 
well as the communicative answer and also work: 
(75) these dogs know the difference between when they are working and when 
they're as they are now 
(76) I'll talk to him sometimes and he will answer you and he knows what words 
are  
(77) my brother says that/that his dog understands everything he says  
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(78) Oh I think they understand a hell of a lot, yes, yes 
 
This final analysis demonstrates some of the ways in which contrasting discursive 
contexts and communicative purposes lead to different ways of representing the same 
kind of animal. There are probably few surprises here: these kinds of texts are fairly 
familiar to general audiences, and dogs are animals that are widely integrated into 
many human societies. However, I suggest that these various linguistic patterns 
represent examples of how this particular kind of animal, the dog, can simultaneously 
occupy different places in a notional hierarchy of characteristics: mechanistic brute, 
useful tool, loyal companion, loving family member and intelligent agent – depending 
on the stance of the human producing the discourse.   
 
Conclusion 
As discussed above, some definitions of animacy rest on the idea of ‘entities’ having 
‘inherent qualities and abilities’ (Folli & Harley, 2008). However, the linguistic 
examples presented in these three short corpus-assisted analyses present some 
challenges to this concept. 
 
One issue of course, which philosophers have grappled with for centuries, is the 
relationship between any real-world ‘entity’ and its representation in the language. 
There are many ways of naming living organisms, but in human language these are all 
likely to be influenced, if not determined, by both human perceptions and human 
interests. Our own experience of ourselves as individual entities, our modes of 
sensory perception, and the conventions by which we name ourselves and other 
entities, all encourage conceptions of animals as members of contrasting species, each 
with fixed characteristics. The linguistic resources available to us are much less 
accommodating of the dynamism, fluidity and contingency that are invoked by the 
concept of organisms and species as ‘assemblages’ (DeLanda, 2016: 149; Dupré, 
2012: 203; Hird, 2009: 67). 
 
A second issue relates to interactions, not only between different aspects of the 
linguistic system, but also between discourse and entities, both organic and inorganic. 
The analyses presented here illustrate the ways in which animals are depicted as 
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participating in various processes, and the relations between those depictions and the 
concerns of the producers of the texts where they are found. Thus researchers 
observing animals in the laboratory will report them as ‘exhibiting’ or ‘showing’ – or 
not – the behaviours that are the objects of their experiments. Participants in 
agricultural and food enterprises emphasise what animals produce. Journalists with an 
interest in ‘newsworthy’ topics construct stories about animals as ‘villains’ and 
‘heroes’, while individuals asked to reflect on their first-hand experiences with 
companion animals represent them with a much greater degree of personhood. The 
analyses of our corpus suggest that the kind of animal accorded the widest range of 
characteristics of animacy there is the dog, which is portrayed as possessing 
differential characteristics, including emotional, social and cognitive capacities. 
 
Necessarily absent from all of these discourses are direct representations from any 
animal’s own perspective. Perceptual capacities are encoded in human languages in 
accordance with human senses, which conventionally include seeing and hearing (the 
more privileged senses), as well as touching, tasting and smelling. Many animals have 
these senses to much greater extents than humans, making it almost certain that their 
perceptual abilities are greater too – e.g. the visual acuity of birds of prey (e.g. 
Ackerman, 2016), the olfactory acuity of dogs. Other species also have sensory 
abilities that are not readily encoded in language, such as those of navigation by 
magnetic field, detection of prey by electrical charge and so on (e.g. Burghardt, 
1991). Characteristics of animals as members of larger groups, such as bees and ants 
in colonies, contrast with the individual notions of identity fostered by many aspects 
of the encoding of human experience in language. And many of the qualities that lead 
to descriptions of dogs as having human-like characteristics are now being recognised 
in other species. A summary of these kinds of capacities in pigs, though with 
reference to similar capacities in a wide range of other species, is presented in Marino 
and Colvin (2015). This survey covers nonsocial cognition (i.e. object discrimination, 
time perception, spatial learning, novelty seeking, inquisitiveness and play), social 
cognition (i.e. discriminating conspecifics and others, and perspective-taking) self-
awareness, emotion, and personality. Contemporary research about animals leading 
non-terrestrial lives, including cetaceans (e.g. Jensen & Tyack, 2013) and octopuses 
(e.g. Godfrey-Smith, 2013) is also widening human understanding of the perceptual, 
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cognitive, behavioural, emotional and social lives of aquatic species. It seems likely, 
then, that human language, or at least the contemporary British English that comprises 
the data analysed here, has some distance to go before it can accommodate the many 
ways in which animals’ animacy may potentially be understood. 
 
Appendix 
Sub-Corpus No of Files 
No. of 
Tokens 
Broadcasts 83 614378 
Campaign literature 470 306680 
Legislation 843 627127 
Food websites 258 87118 
Journals 1609 5698531 
News 1023 466340 
Contributions to the Mass Observation 
Project 
103 174938 
Focus groups 19 229059 
Interviews with text producers 17 157664 
Interviews with guardians/keepers of dogs 19 309719 
Total 4444 8671554 
Table 2. The composition of the main corpus 
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